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Abstract 
This paper tests the existence of rational speculative bubbles during Democratic and Republican 
presidential terms, which has not been systematically researched in existing studies. With monthly real 
returns on equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios in the U.S. from January 1927 to December 
2012, we find that there are rational speculative bubbles under Republican Presidents but not under 
Democratic Presidents. Our results are robust to different specifications. 
Keywords 
Rational speculative bubbles; Duration dependence; Abnormal returns; Presidential terms 
1. Introduction 
The term rational speculative bubbles is used to describe a persistent stock market overvaluation. 
Investors understand assets are sold at prices in excess of their fundamentals, which is the present value 
of all the asset’s future cash flows (Lucas, 1978). However, they believe the bubble will continue to 
expand and yield a high return, compensating them for the probability of a crash. There are a large 
number of studies testing rational speculative bubbles internationally. Among them are Brooks and 
Katsaris (2003) on London stock exchange, Gan et al. (2012) on Hong Kong stock market, Kizys and 
Pierdzioch (2012) on stock markets in a cross section of countries, Watanapalachaikul and Islam 
(2007) on Thai stock market, and Zhang (2008) on Chinese stock market. 
Research on asset prices in the U.S. stock market is also extensive. Some studies focus on rational 
speculative bubbles in general. For example, with monthly returns between 1929 and 1991, McQueen 
and Thorley (1994) find evidence supporting rational speculative bubbles in the U.S. stock market. Lunde 
and Timmermann (2004) argue that the longer an expansion, the lower is its probability to arrive at a 
termination and the longer a contraction, the higher is its probability to come to a termination. Other 
papers explore the relationship between stock market returns and political parties in power. Johnson et 
al. (1999) find that the return differential between Democratic and Republican presidencies is significant 
for small-cap stocks, but insignificant for large-cap stocks. In a seminal study, Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2003)demonstrate that the stock market returns in the U.S. are 9% higher based on value-weighted and 
16% higher based on equally-weighted portfolios under Democratic than Republican presidencies over 
the period of 1927–1998, and they name this result the “presidential puzzle”. 
In this paper we apply the duration dependence test, proposed by McQueen and Thorley (1994), for the 
existence of rational speculative bubbles in the U.S. stock market under different Presidents by political 
affiliation, which has not been systematically researched in existing studies. With monthly returns on 
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios in the U.S. from January 1927 to December 2012, we 
find that rational speculative bubbles exist in the stock market in the U.S. in general, echoing previous 
research. In addition, our empirical results show that rational bubbles exist in the U.S. stock market 
under Republican Presidents but not Democratic Presidents. Various specifications are used and our 
results remain robust. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the duration dependence test 
and Section 3 presents our empirical results. Section 4 concludes and discusses potential extension to 
this paper. 
2. Duration dependence test 
Previous research has adopted a number of methods to test for speculative bubbles in asset prices such 
as tests for autocorrelation and kurtosis (Blanchard and Watson, 1982) and tests for skewness (Evans, 
1986). McQueen and Thorley (1994) propose a duration dependence test for rational speculative 
bubbles, implying an inverse relationship between a run of positive abnormal returns and the length of 
the run. The authors point out that this test is more unique to bubbles than attributes including 
skewness, kurtosis, and autocorrelation which can result from other reasons, such as, time-varying risk 
premiums or asymmetric fundamental news. 
Duration dependence is a characteristic of hazard function for duration times. McQueen and Thorley 
(1994) expect that the hazard function of a run of positive abnormal returns is an inverse function of the 
length of the run. A run is defined as a sequence of abnormal returns (∈𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟) of the same sign. 
Let 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) represent the density function for duration times, and 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) the corresponding distribution 
function. The hazard function ℎ(𝑡𝑡) is the conditional density function for a run with duration of length t, 
given that it lasts at least until t. Specifically: 
ℎ(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)
1−𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) (1) 
If 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 represent the count of completed runs and partial runs, respectively, of length t in the 
sample, the density function version of the log likelihood for data consisting of a set 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇 is as follows: 
𝐿𝐿(𝜃𝜃|𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇) = ∑𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 ln𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ln(1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡) (2) 
where 𝜃𝜃 is a vector of parameters. Following McQueen and Thorley (1994), the hazard function is 
written as the log–logistic functional form: 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 11+𝑒𝑒−(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽ln𝑡𝑡) (3) 
Eq. (3) transforms the unbounded range of 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ln 𝑡𝑡 into the 0,1 space of ℎ(𝑡𝑡), the conditional 
probability of ending a run. The null hypothesis of the duration dependence test is that positive and 
negative returns are random so the probability of ending a run does not depend on prior returns. In this 
model, the null hypothesis indicates constant hazard rates (𝛽𝛽 = 0). Alternatively, 𝛽𝛽 < 0 suggests 
decreasing hazard rates or the probability of a positive run ending decreases as the run gets longer. The 
test is performed by substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) and then maximizing the log-likelihood function with 
respect to 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽. 
3. Rational bubbles during Democratic and Republican presidential 
terms 
We begin this section by focusing on the level of stock returns during different presidencies. Our 
variable of interest is monthly stock portfolio real returns, calculated as the difference between nominal 
returns and the inflation rate (INF).2 Nominal returns on equally-weighted (EWR) and value-weighted 
(VWR) portfolios between January 1927 and December 2012 in the U.S. are obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We report summary statistics for the full sample and two 
subsamples covering Great Depression and WWII and post-WWII in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Summary statistics of real returns for equally- and value-weighted portfolios. 
 
To confirm that our results based on the updated dataset are consistent with previous findings in the 
literature, we first follow Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) to test whether the real returns are 
significantly different under two presidential regimes. We regress real returns on presidential partisan 
dummy variables: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃′𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡+1(4) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ∈  {𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ,𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡} represents real returns on EWR or VWR portfolios, 
respectively; 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 are presidential dummy variables where 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 1 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = 1) if a Republican 
(Democrat) is the president at time t, and zero otherwise; 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡  is a vector of lagged dependent variables 
for the last 3 months as well as macroeconomic/business-cycle variables which are associated with the 
stock market including the default spread (𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) between yields of BAA- and AAA-rated bonds, the 
spread (𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) between the yield to maturity of a 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill, 
the inflation rate (𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡), the relative interest rate (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) defined as the difference between the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate and its 1-year moving average. All data are collected from CRSP. 
We then test the difference between coefficients 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 and report the results in Table 2. As show 
in Table 2, the coefficient on the Republican dummy (𝛼𝛼1) is significantly smaller than that on the 
Democratic dummy (𝛼𝛼2). It suggests that stock market returns are significantly higher under Democratic 
Presidents than under Republican Presidents holding other things constant, which is a similar finding as 
in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003). 
Table 2. Average returns under Republican and Democratic Presidents, controlling for business-cycle and 
lagged dependent variables. 
 
Control variables are: the default spread (DSPt) between yields of BAA- and AAA-rated bonds, the spread (TSPt) 
between the yield to maturity of a 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill, the inflation rate (INFt), 
the relative interest rate (RRt) defined as the difference between the 3-month Treasury bill rate and its 1-year 
moving average, as well as lagged dependent variables for last 3 months. Data are obtained from CRSP. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
Next we test for rational speculative bubbles. The factor of rational speculative bubbles (𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡), or 
abnormal returns, is defined as the deviation of the real returns from the fundamental returns: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖  (5) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ represent real and fundamental returns, respectively. The empirical model we use to 
estimate fundamental and abnormal returns follows McQueen and Thorley (1994): 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟3𝑖𝑖=1  (6) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 ∈  {𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ,𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡}  represents real returns on EWR or VWR portfolios, 
respectively; spreadt-1 is the spread of yield-to-maturity between AAA corporate bond portfolio and the 
3-month Treasury bill, and 𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1⁄  represents the annual dividend yield, which is calculated by the sum 
of the prior 12 monthly valued-weighted portfolio’s dividend yields. Data used to estimate Eq. (6) are 
also obtained from CRSP. The residual 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 is the deviation of real returns from predicted real returns 
based on the fundamental risk premium and autocorrelation, hence representing abnormal returns. Fig. 
1 illustrates the abnormal returns based on real returns on EWR under different presidential terms over 
our sample period. 
 
Fig. 1. Abnormal returns by presidential term, 1926–2012. 
We then conduct the duration dependence test on these abnormal returns and report results in Table 3. 
In our full sample, there are more than 250 runs of positive abnormal returns and approximately 70% of 
them last for 2 months or less. Similarly, there are also about 250 runs of negative abnormal returns 
over our sample period with 80% of them ending at or before the second month. For runs of negative 
abnormal returns, the constant hazard rate (𝛽𝛽 = 0) cannot be rejected at conventional levels. For runs 
of positive abnormal returns, the null hypothesis of constant hazard rate is rejected at the 10% level for 
the EWR portfolio and at the 5% level for the VWR portfolio. These results indicate that speculative 
bubbles exist in the U.S. stock market. 
  
Table 3. Run counts, hazard rates, and duration dependence tests for runs of abnormal returns on 
equally-weighted and valued-weighted portfolios. 
 
 
When we divide the full sample into subsamples based on Republican and Democratic presidencies, the 
duration dependence tests in Panel (b), Table 3 show that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is robustly negative and 
significant at the 5% level for positive runs under Republican Presidents, while not different from zero 
under Democratic Presidents. As also demonstrated in Fig. 2 of estimated hazard rate against the length 
of positive runs during Democratic and Republican presidential terms, the probability of ending a run of 
positive returns (hazard rate) under Republican Presidents declines as the bubble gets larger (measured 
by the length of the positive run), consistent with rational speculative bubbles. In contrast, the 
probability of a positive run ending under Democratic Presidents, does not depend on returns in the 
previous period. These are strong evidence showing that interestingly speculative bubbles exist in the 
U.S. stock market under Republic Presidents, but not under Democratic Presidents. 
 Fig. 2. Kaplan–Meier diagram of estimated hazard rates. 
In Table 4 we provide robustness checks for the basic duration dependence test by measuring abnormal 
returns in different specifications. The results are in general qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. 
  
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis for duration dependence test on positive runs of abnormal returns. 
 
LRT  = likelihood ratio test (χ2-statistic). 
Case 1: Abnormal returns are estimated based on the baseline specification presented in Eq. (6). We estimate 
abnormal returns by revising Eq. (6) under the following alternative specifications. 
Case 2: rt is defined as nominal returns, not real returns. 
Case 3: Financial crisis dummy variable (2008:1–2009:6) is included. 
Case 4: Monthly dummy variables are included. 
Case 5: ARCH-in-mean model is specified. 
Case 6: The linear-logistic function, ht=1/(1+exp[-(α+βt)], is estimated. 
∗p < 0.1. 
∗∗p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
Although the duration dependent test is sufficient to detect the existence of speculative bubbles, it does 
not necessarily show the rationality of the stock market. In a rational market, a speculative bubble will 
not last forever. The longer a positive run of abnormal returns, the more severe a potential crash will be. 
In other words, a market is rational when the conditional mean of abnormal returns is constant even if 
the probability of negative abnormal returns decreases (McQueen and Thorley, 1994). This can happen 
when the conditional skewness of a crash is more negative as the run of prior positive abnormal returns 
lasts longer. As a result, we further test whether the condition of rationality is satisfied in the stock 
market under Republican and Democratic Presidents by examining the mean and skewness of returns 
conditional on the number of prior consecutive positive abnormal returns. 
 
Table 5 presents the estimated results of conditional mean and skewness of abnormal real returns of 
equally-weighted and valued-weighted portfolios. For the full sample, we find that the means of 
abnormal returns conditional on prior runs lasting for one to five periods (𝜖𝜖1−5−𝑟𝑟 ) and for six periods and 
longer (𝜖𝜖6+−𝑟𝑟) are not significantly different from zero. Further, the null hypothesis 
of 𝐻𝐻0: 𝜖𝜖1−5−𝑟𝑟 = 𝜖𝜖6+−𝑟𝑟 cannot be rejected at conventional levels suggesting that the means are not 
significantly different from each other. These results provide strong evidence supporting that the 
bubbles are rational as investors are not able to make any positive abnormal returns when a bubble 
bursts. More importantly, in the full sample the negative skewness coefficient on the abnormal returns 
on the equally-weighted portfolio conditional on prior runs with six and more positive returns (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠6+𝑟𝑟 ) 
is significantly different from the skewness coefficient conditional on prior runs with one to five positive 
returns (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1−5𝑟𝑟 ), which is consistent with the results of our duration dependence test on rational 
speculative bubbles. For the valued-weighted portfolio, we also observe negative skewness coefficients 
conditional on prior runs with six or more positive returns. However, due to the small positive value of 
skewness coefficients conditional on prior runs with one to five positive returns, the null hypothesis of 
constant conditional skewness cannot be rejected at conventional levels. 
 
Table 5. Tests of rationality. 
 
Across presidential parties, we find that the means of abnormal returns conditional on prior positive 
runs lasting for one to five periods and six and more periods are not significantly different from each 
other under either Democratic or Republican Presidents. However, the skewness equality tests show 
that the negative skewness is greater conditioning on prior positive runs lasting for six periods and 
longer during Republican presidency only. These results again indicate rational bubbles exist under 
Republican Presidents, but not under Democratic Presidents, which confirms our findings based on the 
duration dependence test. 
4. Conclusions 
This study applies the duration dependence test to monthly real U.S. stock market returns. Using data of 
both equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios between January 1929 and December 2012, we 
find that there are rational speculative bubbles in the stock market. In addition, the coefficient β in the 
hazard function is significantly negative during Republican presidencies while not significant during 
Democratic presidencies, indicating that rational bubbles exist under Republican Presidents, but not 
under Democratic Presidents. Our results are robust to different specifications. While this is a first step 
to examine speculative bubbles during various presidential terms, it would be interesting for a future 
project to study the reasons for the heterogeneous results in this paper. For example, Allen and Gale 
(2000) note that bank credit to private sectors might be a major cause of speculative bubbles based on 
data from a selection of countries. In addition, demand for assets, which may be proxied by savings rate, 
could also play a role in causing the different results concerning speculative bubbles we find in this 
paper. 
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